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 CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION
1 General background 
This paper discusses the progress of international anti-money laundering (AML) law with 
regard to making tax evasion a predicate offence for the crime of money laundering (ML). 
This paper will focus particularly on the recent amendments that the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) made to its 40 + 9 Recommendations. The FATF Recommendations are 
recognised as the global AML standards.1 The amendments to these have resulted in tax 
crimes being made designated offences for ML.2 The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the 
rationale behind this change and to assess the implications of bringing fiscal crimes under 
the AML regime. 
1.1 The FATF Recommendations
The FATF is an “inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect 
the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing 
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”.3 Currently the FATF consists of 36 
member countries, eight associate members, the so-called FATF-Styled Regional Bodies, 
and 26 observers.4 The FATF is housed within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), in Paris. 
The FATF standards are a broad criminal law framework for combating ML. These 
standards lay down the criteria for criminalising particular types of conduct as conduct 
falling within the meaning of ML. In addition, they provide a framework which countries 
1 191 countries have been endorsed the FATF standards, according to the FATF Annual Report 2010-2011. 
“The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-
terrorist financing (CFT) standard”; The FATF Recommendations (2012). This paper focuses on AML.
2 The FATF Recommendations (2012: 112).
3 The FATF Recommendations (2012: 1).
4 FATF (2012d).
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could implement to recover the proceeds of ML offences (assets recovery), and they also 
set out how countries can go about preventing the misuse of financial institutions and non-
financial designated businesses and professions (e.g. law firms) for ML purposes. The 
standards are made up of the Recommendations themselves as well as the Interpretive 
Notes to each Recommendation and the applicable definitions in the Glossary. 
The Recommendations are a source of soft law, which means that governments are not 
legally bounded to implement these measures. Yet, given the fact that soft law can be very 
influential, to the point that it can be very forceful, just like hard law, the FATF wields 
tremendous political binding power. The implementation of the Recommendations is, in 
fact, rigorously assessed through Mutual Evaluation processes, and through the 
assessments conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that, when assessing compliance with 
FATF standards,” the word should has the same meaning as must”.5  
Non-member countries, i.e. those not belonging to the FATF, are assessed by FATF-styled 
Regional Bodies to see whether their laws and policies comply with those laid down by the 
FATF Recommendations. After such mutual evaluations are conducted, Mutual Evaluation 
Reports are compiled, and countries which are found to be non-compliant with the 
standards are called upon to address the deficiencies. A follow-up report is thereafter 
published, the idea being to keep the countries on their toes. Jurisdictions which are found 
to be clearly non-compliant could be sanctioned. Such sanctions take the form of 
expressions of concern, formal letters, public statements,6 or a threat to suspend the 
5 The FATF Recommendations (2012: 120).
6 Turkey was found clearly non-compliant in 1996. The OECD president sent a letter to the Turkish minister, 
afterwards a high level mission went to Ankara to call for urgent action, and a public statement was made 
referring to the possibility of sanctions. See Pieth (2004: 20).
2
 
 
 
 
country’s membership.7 Between the years 2000 and 2006, the FATF listed 23 Non-
cooperative Countries and Territories (hereafter NCCTs) as lacking an effective anti-money 
laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) system. Jurisdictions whose 
mutual evaluation reveals key deficiencies are referred to the International Co-operation 
Review Group for a preliminary review. If, notwithstanding the review process, jurisdictions 
are found to be non-compliant, the FATF calls upon its members to consider the risks 
arising from the deficiencies associated with each of the jurisdictions.8
The FATF’s persuasiveness stems from the fact that it has the enormous ability to 
influence whether or not a country can be seen as a viable business partner or an 
investment destination. Being “blacklisted” by the FATF reduces the ability of a country of 
doing business internationally. There is, therefore, a very strong incentive to implement the 
FATF’s Recommendations. Additionally, the FATF standards are hardened by the fact that 
they can be incorporated into UN Security Council Resolutions.9
However, the authority of the FATF to require compliance with its standards has been 
criticised because the FATF is not a treaty-based organisation, and therefore does not 
have a legal mandate.10 Another point of criticism is that the review process in respect of 
non-member jurisdictions which did not accept the FATF’s authority, lacks legitimacy.11
Yet, it can be argued, that those countries have accepted membership in FATF-
Style Regional Bodies, and through this, the FATF exercises its authority over them.
Despite facing criticism of lacking accountability and transparency,12 the informality of the 
7 Austria was found non-compliant in 1999. After years of inactivity of the Austrian government, the FATF 
threatened the country with suspension. See Pieth (2004: 20).
8 FATF (2012a: 2).
9 For example, the UNSC Resolution 1617 of 2005 urged the international community to implement the 
FATF Standards; Paragraph 7 S/RES/1617.
10 Sharman (2008: 645).
11 Bosworth-Davies (2006:358); Pieth (2011: 22).
12 Blazejewski (2007: 1).
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FATF is the key feature that gives it this flexibility, which allows the task force to respond 
quickly to the ever-evolving practices of money launderers. For this reason, this paper’s 
main hypothesis is that tackling tax evasion under the umbrella of the FATF regulations 
can result in a more effective global fight against tax crimes, thanks to the FATF’s power to 
influence national criminal laws and to press for the harmonization of AML regulations.
1.2 Tax evasion and its global impact
This paper deals with tax evasion insofar as it affects the international community.  
It focuses on “grand” tax evasion as  committed by big corporations and high net-worth 
individuals and how this evasive conduct results in the depletion of national economies. 
The focus is  particularly on tax evasion that is committed through transnational 
transactions involving the transfer of huge amounts of money, a process which qualifies to 
be included in the category of illicit financial flows. The latter are proceeds of crimes or of 
legal activities which become illicit when transported across borders in violation of national 
laws, such as tax laws.13 
High-level tax evasion affects both developing and industrialised countries. A study 
conducted by Baker in 2005 revealed that two-thirds of global cross-border movements of 
dirty money are related to funds generated from commercial activities, mostly linked to 
attempts to evade paying taxes.14 In practice, the evasion of tax by companies results in 
developing countries losing up to US$160 billion a year.15 Because of tax evasion, West 
Africa, for example, has an estimated government revenue loss of 50% of potential 
13  For a more comprehensive definition of “illicit financial flows” and methods of estimation, see GFI (2008: 
1 et seq).
14 Baker has estimated the cross-border flows of global dirty money as amounting to between US$1 trillion 
and US$ 1.6 trillion annually. This included US$ 0.3 – US$ 0.5 trillion emerging from criminal activities 
(drugs, counterfeit goods, smuggling, racketeering, etc), and US$ 0.7 – US$ 1 trillion arising from illegal 
commercial transactions, notably those violating national tax laws. See Baker (2005: 172), as cited also in 
UNODC (2011: 34).
15 Christian Aid (2008: 2).”We predict that illegal, trade-related tax evasion alone will be responsible for 
some 5.6 million deaths of young children in the developing world between 2000 and 2015”; Christian Aid 
(2008: 1).
4
 
 
 
 
revenues.16 Tax is the most sustainable revenue source for developing countries. This is 
why governments must be made accountable to the citizens, the taxpayers, rather than to 
the donors.17 Money that should contribute to public spending but which is instead stashed 
away to benefit only a tiny minority of the population, contributes to poverty and impedes 
social and economic development.18 It is for these reasons that aggressive tax avoidance19 
is seen as one of the causes of the financial crisis, as huge amounts of money are 
siphoned away from national revenues.20
The April G20 Summit of 2009 declared that the major causes of the financial crisis were 
failures in the financial sector and deregulation. In particular, secrecy has contributed to 
the crisis by making it impossible for financial institutions to make reliable estimates of the 
assets of other institutions, an information asymmetry which negatively affects 
transactions. The secrecy surrounding assets held offshore was heavily criticised at the 
2009 G20 Summit,21 so much that Switzerland, which is known for its strict bank secrecy 
laws, accepted that there was a need for it to “relax” its bank secrecy rules.22
The cost of tax evasion is, at the end of the day, borne by dutiful taxpayers, who end up 
assuming larger portion of costs of government. This increases the gap between poor and 
rich, and thus undermines the value of tax in a democratic society, which is the 
redistribution of resources.23 Since illicit flows deriving from tax evasion are embedded in 
the globalised economy, the answer should also be an international one. 
16 GIABA (2010:20). “Nigeria is the region’s biggest economy but taxes amount to a mere 6.1% of Nigeria’s 
GDP of about $170 billion”; GIABA (2010: 19).
17 Shaxson (2011: 200).
18 “For example, former Nigerian dictator General Sani Abacha, was reported to have stashed away away $ 
4 billion by using banks in Switzerland and London. This money could have been used to provide sorely-
needed social services and to alleviate poverty”. Otusanya & Lauwo (2012: 355).
19 This paper supports the idea that aggressive tax avoidance should be legally treated as tax evasion; see 
Chapter 2.
20 “Tax distortions are likely to have contributed to excessive leveraging and other financial market problems   
that came to the forefront during the crisis”; IMF (2009: 8).
21 “The era of banking secrecy is over”; G20 (2009).
22 Simonian (2009).
23 Barker (2009: 239).
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1.3 Tax evasion and money laundering
Flows of ill-gotten money is facilitated by the existence of offshore finance and the misuse 
of financial tools. These structures allow also gains obtained through licit activities to be 
concealed from national revenue authorities for the purposes of evading the payment of 
taxes. In the end, these sums are repatriated and integrated into the economic circuit of 
the country from which they are whisked away. This cycle, in sum, constitutes money 
laundering. ML is a three-stage process which starts with the money coming from the 
crime first being placed somewhere to hide its link to the crime (placement). After it has 
been placed it is layered, which means its connection to the crime and the criminal is 
further disguised. This can be done, for example, by a series of transactions, a process 
which often involves the money being transferred through several banks abroad or being 
used to set up shell companies in tax havens (layering). After it has been layered 
successfully, the money (which can also be in the form of property) is then integrated into 
the lawful economy (integration). These three phases are not always clearly separated; 
sometimes the placement and the integration overlap. What is essential, is that the 
criminal must have the intention to conceal the provenance of the ill-gotten assets from the 
criminal justice authorities.
In the case of money deriving from tax evasion, there is a debate concerning the 
unlawfulness of the origin of those assets. Tax evasion is an economic crime which has no 
identifiable direct victims. It is also a white collar crime, meaning conduct in violation of 
criminal law, committed by persons of respectability and high social status. When 
corporate tax, which is payable by companies, is evaded, it is hard to identify the 
individuals responsible. Therefore, in practice, tax evasion can be perceived to be 
comparatively less criminal than say, organised crime, because the perpetrators wear a 
cloak of legitimacy, and because it often difficult to identify a victim, unless it is some 
6
 
 
 
 
abstract construct like society or the  economy.24 This has raised, and will raise concerns at 
a national level, for states that do not yet regard tax crimes as predicate offences (i.e. 
offences which give rise to ML).
1.4 The significance of the introduction of tax crimes in the FATF 
Recommendations
The FATF Recommendations were revised in February 2012 in order to “strengthen global 
safeguards and further protect the integrity of the financial system by providing 
governments with stronger tools to take action against serious crime”.25 Tax crimes have 
been included as predicate offences for ML, with the aim of contributing to better co-
ordination between law enforcement, border and tax authorities, and removing potential 
obstacles to international cooperation regarding tax crimes.26 The idea behind making tax 
crimes predicate offences of ML is that this should result in a higher deterrent effect on 
would-be tax evaders, since it brings fiscal crimes into the money laundering fold.
High-level tax evasion is often committed through the help of professionals, such as 
lawyers, accounting firms, tax advisors, financial service providers; the fact that these 
actors may face charges of ML, can be a high deterrent. Financial institutions and non-
financial designated businesses and professions have, in fact, an obligation to detect 
suspected tax-dodgers among their clients, and report suspicious transactions. But above 
all, the change in the FATF Recommendations will also involve the removal of some of the 
obstacles to co-operation between tax authorities among different countries.
2 Hypothesis and scope
This paper aims at analysing the suitability of the AML regime, for the purpose of tackling 
tax evasion. The international soft law AML standards are set by the FATF. The latter 
expects states to implement these standards at a national level, and has created so-called 
24 Goredema (2006: 123).
25 FATF (2012c: 1).
26 FATF (2012c: 2).
7
 
 
 
 
FATF-styled regional bodies to monitor how the standards are implemented by the various 
countries. Considering the fact that tax regimes are largely based on national law, the 
choice of limiting the scope to tax evasion is due to the fact that most countries criminalise 
tax evasion, for it is treated as tax crime.27 Furthermore, the FATF limits the scope of the 
Recommendations to serious tax crimes, thus leaving out minor fiscal contraventions. The 
assumption on which the paper is based is, indeed, that tax evasion, associated with illicit 
financial flows and tax competition, is emerging as an issue requiring global attention.28
The analysis and argument will be informed by the theory that there must be a correlation 
and a proportionality between the mischief sought to be eradicated, which is tax evasion 
through the use of tax havens, and the economic benefit that accrues, which is the 
potential reduction in the sums of money that are diverted away from the legal economy. 
The overarching question will be: Is the AML regime a suitable framework to cope with tax 
crimes? Inherent in this question are the following sub-questions: How are tax crimes 
related to ML?; What was the rationale behind including tax crimes as a designated 
category of offences for ML in the revised FATF Recommendations?; What are the 
implications of this change on FATF member jurisdictions and members of regional-related 
bodies?; How can this change in the FATF standards contribute to solving debates about 
the advisability of considering tax crimes under the AML regime, at a national level?
3 Methodology and significance
This paper fits in the general debate about the necessity of dealing with the fine line 
between the lawful and unlawful economy, the so-called “grey zone”. The “grey zone” is 
the space where profits are made in an illicit way but with the appearance of having been 
27 There is a distinction in tax law between tax avoidance, which is often perceived as licit, and tax evasion 
which is, on the contrary, a crime. Both behaviours aim at saving tax. For further clarification of these two 
terms, see Chapter 2.
28 Tax Justice Network (2005: 3).
8
 
 
 
 
made lawfully. The most used method to conceal the illicit origin of profit is through ML. 
This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on international AML law. The 
originality of the work lies in the combined economic-legal analysis of tax crimes and in the 
approach of discussing ML and tax evasion as related phenomena. 
In order to understand the context of this study better, the analysis of the law, both the 
hard and the soft law, will be aligned closely to the theoretical assumptions spelt out in the 
hypothesis above, and this will include looking into both the sociological and economic 
factors that play a role in arriving at a more balanced understanding of the issues at play 
here. This is a pure desktop study. This means that the research will be conducted using 
the standard primary sources on international AML standards, regional instruments and 
structures, and national laws.
4 Structure of the paper
This paper contains four more chapters. Chapter 2 deals with the criminalisation of tax 
offences under the umbrella of the crime of ML. Firstly, the chapter gives an overview on 
the international tax regime; secondly, it discusses the concept of “tax competition” and 
analyses the international status of offshore jurisdictions. Secondly, the chapter defines tax 
evasion, in contrast to the concepts of tax mitigation and tax avoidance; thereafter the 
chapter approaches the idea of criminalising tax evasion as a predicate crime for ML, in 
line with the approach of “follow the money” to tackle crime. The paper seeks to 
understand whether tax evasion would fall into the category of predicate offences, 
according to the rationale of criminalisation of ML, or whether there would be other 
categories more suitable for the purpose, if any. By recalling the change in the FATF 
Recommendations, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the consequences for 
professionals, financial institutions, and law enforcement institutions, of including tax 
9
 
 
 
 
evasion under the umbrella of ML, and the challenges that this will raise, and is already 
raising. 
Chapter 3 deals with the current international AML framework. Firstly, it gives an overview 
of the historical process that has brought the FATF to revise the Recommendations and to 
include tax crimes as predicate offences for ML. Secondly, the chapter analyses and 
defines the scope and the impact, in terms of criminalisation of conducts and of preventive 
measures, of new FATF Recommendation 3. In conclusion, the chapter deals with the 
implementation of the FATF regime of regional groups, in Africa and in Europe. 
Chapter 4 provides a closer analysis of a national jurisdiction, Italy, with the aim of 
assessing the suitability of including tax evasion as predicate offence for ML, in a domestic 
system. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how to sustain the 
working of the global financial system against the background of the phenomenon of tax 
evasion. 
10
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 TAX EVASION AND MONEY LAUNDERING
1 Tax in the international arena
1.1 The international tax regime
A tax is “a contribution to state revenue, compulsorily levied on people, business, property, 
income, commodities, transactions, etc”.29 Tax serves four main purposes: collection of 
revenue by the state, redistribution of resources for the benefit of citizenry and the 
economy, political representation, and re-pricing economic alternatives.30 At the beginning 
of the 20th century income and profit tax became the main source of governments' 
revenue. Tax was calculated either on source or residence basis,31 according to national 
laws. Consequently, corporations and individuals, operating in different countries, 
complained about the imposition of double taxation on interstate business and 
transactions. Governments started concluding bilateral agreements to avoid double 
taxation and encourage investment. Bilateral agreements either allocated the right to 
collect tax to one of the states (residence or source state), or required one of the two 
states to grant double taxation relief. The League of Nations decided to tackle this issue 
and founded in 1929 a permanent Fiscal Committee of the League. This Committee 
drafted the concept that has become known as “the UN model”, as a basis for bilateral tax 
agreements, which differentiates itself from the “OECD model”. The first is a “source 
country” oriented model, which advantages host countries of investment, while the latter 
follows the “residence country” approach, which is preferable for capital-exporting 
countries.32 
29 Oxford English Dictionary (2007: 3189).
30 Cobham (2005: 5).
31 Profits on an investment can be taxed both in the host country of the investment (source country 
jurisdiction) and in the residence country of the investor (residence country jurisdiction); Lennard (2008: 
23). 
32   For a detailed study on the differences between the two models, see Lennard (2008).
11
 
 
 
 
The OECD model was established in 1963 by the OECD's Fiscal Committee, which 
drafted the Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital, that has been updated 
and become the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital in July 2010. Both 
approaches aim at eliminating double taxation, to favour international investments. 
Currently, almost 3500 bilateral tax treaties are based on this instrument, or on the UN 
Model Tax Convention.33 
Bilateral treaties, together with the the OECD and the UN Model Conventions and other 
transnational instruments, create the international tax regime. The other main tax related 
instruments are:34 the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters,35 the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters;36 the International 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and 
Repression of Customs Offences.37 Additionally, there are regional treaties which deal with 
information exchange, double taxation, co-operation in tax matters, and mutual 
assistance.38
1.2 (Harmful) Tax competition
The challenged faced currently by the international tax regime is no longer that of double 
taxation, but rather that of “double non-taxation”.39 By exploiting loopholes and 
33   OECD (2012b: 14).
34   For a complete and updated catalogue of all instruments existing, see OECD (2012b).
35 Released by the OECD in 2002. At the moment there are more than 600 bilateral Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements based on this model; OECD (2012b: 36).
36 Developed in 1998 by the OECD and the Council of Europe. Currently 30 states have ratified the Protocol 
of 2010; OECD (2012b: 41).
37 Adopted in Nairobi in 1977, under the auspices of the World Customs Organization, it entered into force 
in 1980. Currently, 28 Parties have acceded to the Convention; OECD (2012b: 69).
38 Within the EU, the main instruments are the Council Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation 
in the Field of Taxation; the EU Council Regulation No. 904/2010 on Administrative Cooperation and 
Combating Fraud in the Field of Value Added Tax; and the Convention on Mutual Assistance and 
Cooperation Between Customs Administrations. Most relevant instruments in the African region are: The 
Convention A/P5/5/82 for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters issued of the Economic 
Community of West African States; Annexure 3 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment which 
focuses on Tax Coordination in the region to facilitate trade. The Tax Administration Forum, a OECD 
baked initiative, is a platform that facilitates tax co-operation between developing and industrialised 
countries.
39 Shaxson (2011: 23); Rosenzweig (2012: 720).
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opportunities of different tax regimes, corporations and individuals manage to pay very low 
or no tax on their income or profit.
This is seen as licit “tax competition” between states, in a free market economy. 
Competition among tax regimes is considered to promote global economic efficiency.40 The 
idea behind this is that citizens and corporations should be able to choose their own tax 
regime for their wealth and income; states, on the other hand, should be free to provide 
competitive fiscal regulations. This would punish less efficient countries with harsher fiscal 
regimes, and boost international business.41
Countries, in which foreign investors pay less tax than national companies, and much less 
than what they would pay in their home country, are known as offshore countries. States, 
especially those with small economies, have engaged in tax competition in order to attract 
foreign investment. They used the globalisation of capital movements as an opportunity for 
receiving economic resources and thus boost development. It has been demonstrated42 
that hosting offshore finance has been lucrative for small island economies, since the 
1960s, as regards employment opportunities and the overall contribution to public 
revenues and GDP. In addition, offshore jurisdictions perform faster economic growth than 
do other countries, and are well-governed countries, although this seems inconsistent with 
their reputation.43
This paper, despite taking into consideration the reasons and the positive consequences of 
becoming an offshore jurisdiction, embraces the idea that fiscal competition leads to a 
“race to the button”,44 and is hence harmful. This paper advocates a global tax 
40 Shaxson (2011: 188); Christensen (2011: 190).
41 Masciandaro (2006: 369).
42 Hampton & Christensen (2010: 2).
43 James & Hines (2010: 118; 121).
44 Shaxson (2011: 184).
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harmonisation, as a key factor for a more sustainable finance. There is no evidence, in 
fact, that tax competition improves the quality of trade, or the service for customers, or the 
free market. The offshore financial system, instead, has been proven to be one of the 
causes of the financial crisis, poverty, and in general, a system that redistributes wealth 
upwards and risks downwards.45 Elites and corporations using offshore jurisdictions, while 
profiting from public services, social benefits, and domestic security, do not pay for any of 
them.46 
Moreover, offshore finance is not a sustainable source of revenues. The banking crises of 
2007 and 2008 have affected offshore jurisdictions, by reducing the value of deposits held. 
Particularly small economies, which based their GDP on foreign investments and are 
therefore dependent on offshore finance, are not ready to diversify the local economy, to 
combat the financial crisis. In fact, as these countries have a big part of the population 
employed in the financial sector, there is a lack of other professional skills.47 Offshore 
finance affects developing countries negatively: Global Financial Integrity estimated that 
approximately US$ 858 to US$ 1 trillion flows annually from poorer countries as proceeds 
of corruption, state looting and tax evasion;48 the main destinations are offshore 
jurisdictions in the developed world. Illicit flows from Africa, for example, flow mostly into 
the British offshore system.49 In addition, offshore jurisdictions can easily attract criminal 
investment and terrorist financing transactions. The “anthropologic” argument, used often 
45 Shaxson (2011: 148).
46 Action Aid has observed that SAB Miller, the second largest brewery in the world, relies on services 
provided from the state, as much as citizens do: it owns property, thus benefits from the enforcement of 
the rule of law to keep its property rights; it uses public roads and ports; it relies on states to provide them 
educated workforce. All these benefits should come “with a quid pro quo: the tax that companies pay on 
their own income”. However, this company has paid no taxes in the last two years, thanks to aggressive 
tax avoidance practices, therefore it has profited from public services, without having contributed to them. 
See Action Aid (2012: 34).
47 See the study case conducted on Jersey. However, other authors are less pessimistic with regard to the 
future of small offshore jurisdictions; Christensen & Hampton (2010: 14).
48 Kar & Cartwright‐Smith (2008: 22).
49 Shaxson (2011: 18).
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in support of tax competition, is that it is intrinsic in human nature to try to pay as little tax 
as possible; this, however, should not result in a race to the button, since tax payers will try 
to pay less tax even where tax rates are already very low.50
1.3 The offshore world
“The offshore world is all around us”.51 Offshore wealth amounted to US$7.4 trillion in 
2009, equivalent to 6.6% of globally held assets.52 An estimated 50% of global commerce 
passes through offshore jurisdictions.53
Regulatory authorities and organisations adopt different definitions of “offshore”. Often, 
other terms are employed, such as tax havens, financial havens, secrecy jurisdictions, 
financial offshore centres, or offshore centres. All these notions refer to places that offer an 
escape from tax, provide secrecy and lax financial regulations, attract foreign investment 
through fiscal competition with other countries, and are reluctant to exchange tax 
information with other countries. Usually, these jurisdictions result in having financial 
services industry much larger than their local economy.54 According to the different 
definitions, diverse lists of countries have been drafted.55 Depending on the choice of 
definition, between 30 and 70 tax havens exist. 
Attractive tax regimes can be modelled by providing very low tax rates on specific 
services. The Netherlands Antilles, for example, do not apply withholding tax on interest or 
royalties; Dutch holding companies are, thus, able to receive tax free dividends and capital 
gains originating from their subsidiaries, and at the same time are allowed to deduct 
expenses, including interest on loans. Usually, countries make use of offshore jurisdictions 
50 Bridges (200: 161).
51 Shaxson (2011: 8).
52 UNODC (2011: 44).
53 Baker (2005: 134).
54 Shaxson (2011: 9). 
55 For the most relevant lists, see IMF (2003: 26); OECD (2000); Tax Justice Network (2011).
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which are located geographically close to them.
A defining aspect of these jurisdictions is the provision of conditions of secrecy, either 
through banking secrecy laws or through judicial arrangements and banking practices.56 
Secrecy can be a risk factor: The anonymity of financial transactions and the opaqueness 
of offshore operations make these jurisdictions vulnerable to financial abuse. Banking 
secrecy was established in Switzerland in 1930. Violation of banking confidentiality was 
made a criminal offence, with the purpose of protecting Jewish money from the Nazi 
regime.57 Currently, secrecy covers not only banking activities, but the whole range of 
financial transactions. Regulations that provide secrecy include laws that allow a low 
degree of transparency in the establishment and accounting by corporate entities, the 
creation of trusts whose real beneficiaries remain anonymous, zero or low tax rates and 
minimal exchange of tax information with other tax jurisdictions, banking secrecy, and 
barriers to exchange of information on criminal matters.58
Secrecy is a controversial topic. The right to privacy is a fundamental right of any 
individual,59 and secrecy can, in fact, serve licit and valid purposes. Politically persecuted 
individuals can use secrecy to secure their assets from being confiscated by authoritarian 
regimes; and secrecy can also be in the interest of the family.60 
Yet, secrecy should not be exploited for unlawful purposes, such as violations of national 
tax law. The veil of secrecy is a bar to investigations, thus a guarantee of impunity. This 
56 Christensen (2011: 183); Leikvang (2012: 301).
57 Although this view is commonly accepted, some authors state that the Swiss law was passed only after 8 
days of Hitler's installation as imperial chancellor, and therefore did not directly aim at evading German 
Intelligence's control of Jewish assets. See Shaxson (2011: 51).
58 Reed & Fontana (2011).
59 Article 12 of the United Nations Declaration on Human rights.
60 For example, the original purpose of trusts (financial tools which provide secrecy) was to promote the 
protection of spouses who are unable to look after their own affairs. See Christensen (2011: 183).
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makes the concealing of financial transactions seductive for terrorists as much as 
organised criminal groups, tax evaders, and corrupt political elites who need to stash away 
huge amount of money. Secrecy has been used by corrupt dictators around the world to 
conceal stolen assets.61 Secrecy mechanisms are complex and expensive, but “people will 
pay for secrecy because it costs less than disclosure”.62 Banking secrecy had been used 
as a ground to refuse mutual legal assistance and co-operation in criminal matters, thus 
impeding or hindering criminal investigations or other legal proceedings. International 
consensus on the importance of preventing the use of banking secrecy, as an obstacle to 
provide assistance to requesting states, has been achieved after long negotiations.63 
In order to tackle lack of transparency in the financial system, the international community 
has been concluding Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), which are bilateral 
treaties that aim at allowing an easier exchange of information on tax matters. However, 
often these instruments require dual criminality for the exchange of information; this results 
in a bar to assistance especially when dealing with tax matters with offshore jurisdictions, 
which notably have lax fiscal legislations.64 Sometimes TIEAs do not provide for automatic 
exchange of information, and may impose notification to the assets owner before a 
disclosure order is issued.65 
The main problem remains the fact that these agreements, even though they might be 
efficient in tackling abuse of fiscal regimes between the two countries, are not 
comprehensive. There will always be an offshore jurisdiction which has no TIEA with a 
specific country, where tax-dodgers can shift their funds. Yet, according to the Financial 
61 Baker (2005: 238).
62 Alldridge (2003: 32).
63 UNODC (2010: 319 et seq.). 
64   Leikvang (2012: 302).
65 Leikvang (2012: 317).
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Times, banking secrecy laws will probably be degraded to the point of being disabled 
within the course of the coming decade.66
1.4 International initiatives to tackle the abuse of the offshore world
In the last 15 years the fight against offshore jurisdictions has been promoted by the UN, 
the US, the EU, the G20, the OECD, the IMF and the WB. The first main step was 
undertaken by the G7 and the OECD, with the “Harmful Tax Competition” Initiative  of 
1998, which identified harmful tax practices and provided the definition of a “tax haven”,67 
thus allowing the OECD to publish a list of tax havens.68 In 1999 the Financial Stability 
Forum was established by the G7 countries to promote financial stability by focusing on 
international cooperation regarding the exchange of information and overview of financial 
markets. In 2000, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters was established by the OECD, as a framework to monitor the implementation of 
globally endorsed tax transparency standard.69 The Global Forum currently includes 92 
countries and promotes tax information exchange agreements among them; yet most 
participants are from industrialised countries. In 2005, the EU Savings Tax Directive 
included associated and dependent territories,70 which are often used as offshore systems 
by the protectorate state. However, the Directive had a loophole, in the regulation of trusts.  
A “beneficial owner”, under European law,71 is only an individual; this has allowed limited 
companies to hold funds on deposit, without a duty to disclose.72 In addition countries like 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and outside the EU, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man 
have objected to the Directive and excluded themselves from the obligation to furnish 
66 Simonian (2009).
67 OECD (1998: 21 et seq).
68 OECD (2000: 17).
69 OECD (2012a).
70 Anguilla,  Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Other jurisdictions agreed to 
participate: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland.
71 Article 2 of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC.
72 Tax Justice Network (2008: 4).
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information. A breakthrough judgement was handed down in 2006, by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), in the Halifax case.73 The ECJ affirmed the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of EC law, by referring to the ongoing movement to combat and prevent avoidance 
and evasion. This will affect the principle of neutrality of VAT. 
After the financial crisis of 2008/2009, initiatives to tackle the abuse of the offshore world 
have accelerated, because of domestic budgetary pressure. In 2009, at the London 
meeting, the G20 launched a new initiative to tackle tax havens, led by the OECD, which 
broadened the list, by including European countries, such as Switzerland, Austria, 
Luxembourg. In 2011, the US introduced the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, with the purpose 
of “restricting the use of offshore tax havens and abusive tax shelters”.74
Yet, this response to harmful tax competition also has controversial aspects. International 
organisations have identified offshore jurisdictions as “high risk” countries with regard to 
ML and terrorist financing threats. Often, the “war on terror” has been used to impose strict 
financial regulations on poor countries, without reasonable cost-effectiveness planning, 
thus resulting in an unbearable burden.75 The systems of “blacklisting” and “naming and 
shaming” that are applied to point out jurisdictions that are not in line with international 
standards, have been proven to be harmful and not efficient to promote financial integrity.76 
In addition, the OECD, an organisation led mainly by industrialised countries, has been 
criticised for applying a double standard when listing major tax havens. For example, it has 
never mentioned the UK and the US.77 The OECD has also been accused of financial 
imperialism, with the argument that no nation has the right to tell another sovereign entity 
73 ECJ case C-255/02.
74 Leikvang (2012: 320).
75 Rahn (2008: 341); Bosworth-Davies (2008: 180); Sharman (2011: 55).
76 Pieth (2004: 21); Sharman (2011: 50). 
77 Christensen & Hampton (2010: 8).
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which fiscal policy to adopt. The OECD initiative to tackle tax havens has been criticised 
as an attempt by European countries to prevent their own citizens moving their assets to 
non-OECD countries with less punitive tax laws, by forcing the latter to raise tax rates and 
abolish financial privacy.78
Although unilateral and regional actions play an important role in the fight against harmful 
tax competition, there is need for collective action to find a unified international solution.
However, tax is a matter of sovereignty, therefore it is particularly difficult to obtain 
consensus on the creation of any international organisation dealing with the matter, and 
which has power to influence national parliaments. The FATF, through the work of the 
regional bodies, can be the right authority to address this issue.
2 Tax evasion, avoidance and mitigation
2.1 Definitions
This paper focuses on tax evasion as one of many fiscal offences. Tax evasion is “any 
illegal action taken to avoid the lawful assessment of taxes; for example, by concealing or 
failing to declare income”.79 The concept of tax evasion is often defined in opposition to tax 
avoidance and tax mitigation. Tax mitigation is the minimisation of taxes, with the approval 
and/or knowledge of the government. An example is the deduction of donations to charity. 
This behaviour is thus legal, in contrast to tax evasion. 
“Tax avoidance” is a very controversial term.80 Tax avoidance is “the lawful arrangement or 
planning of one's affairs so as to reduce liability to tax”.81 Tax avoidance, thus, exploits the 
uncertainty that results from the incongruence between the literal interpretation of the law 
78 Rahn (2002: 341).
79 Law (2006: 529).
80 “The term tax avoidance does not have a limiting and definite meaning”; Barker (2009: 230).
81   Law (2006: 527).
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and the intent of the legislative power. What makes this concept disputable is that the tax 
advantages pursued by tax avoiders are unintended by lawmakers, despite being formally 
in accordance with the law. Tax avoidance and evasion are impelled by the same 
motivation, and they have the same result, which is the paying of less taxes. Yet, they are 
treated as different in nature.
Tax evasion is usually described as illegal, whereas tax avoidance is identified as legal. A 
better interpretation is offered by Barker who describes tax avoidance as “noncriminal 
behaviour”, not as “legal behaviour”.82 Tax avoidance is not contra legem, but extra legem. 
National law might, indeed, provide a general anti-avoidance clause.83 Although “tax 
avoidance is recognized today by practically all governments as a serious threat to the 
integrity of the tax system in democratic societies”,84 there is still great support for 
avoidance. Tax avoidance is also regarded to be a right of the person to deal freely with 
property and to enter freely into contracts.85
Tax avoidance is a borderline conduct. This paper supports the view that aggressive tax 
avoidance should become a criminal offence, by expanding the scope of tax evasion, or of 
tax fraud. This chapter deals with both the effects of tax avoidance and tax evasion. In 
order to tackle abusive offshore practices, both concepts are, in fact, key. In the next 
chapter, the term “tax crimes” will be used, since the FATF Recommendations use a wide 
category which has to be limited according to domestic law.
2.2 Methods of evading tax
Tax can be evaded through different mechanisms and tools, such as transfer pricing, false 
82 Barker (2009: 243).
83 For example, Italian fiscal law (articolo 37bis, comma 8, del Dpr 600/1973); Section 245 of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act; Part IV A of the Australian Income tax Act; Section BB9 of the New Zealand Income Tax 
Act. Tax Law Review Committee (1997: 19; 23; 24).
84 Barker (2009: 229).
85   Barker (2009: 234).
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documentation, dummy corporations, shell banks, kickbacks, wire transfers, numbered 
accounts, trusts, shell corporations, earnings stripping, or repatriation of dividends.
Trusts are financial tools which have a primary lawful purpose. They allow, for example, 
holders of assets to put them in the hands of others to protect the interests of minor 
children or people who are unable to care for themselves. They are also used to transfer 
and hold assets for charitable purposes. Problems arise when trusts are used to conceal 
the origin and distribution of illegal funds, because the law of the offshore jurisdiction 
permits the obscuring of the identity of both the settlor and the beneficiary.
Fictitious pricing serves to implement tax evasion schemes between countries. It is called 
“mispricing” in unrelated-party transactions, and abusive transfer pricing in related-party 
transactions.86 Also quantities, qualities, weights, measurements can be completely faked 
with money flowing for trade that never existed. Transfer pricing occurs between related 
companies, when trading with each other. Traded products are, in fact, not subjected to 
neutral market evaluation, instead, the group's accountants decide what price they should 
pay each other. International standards would require them to do this based on the arm’s 
length price, which is the price that the company would be supposed to pay for a product 
when buying it from a non-related company. If the companies, instead, under-value or over 
-value commodities or services, with the sole aim of reducing their tax liability, this 
constitutes mispricing. This can amount to tax evasion, according to national law.
Multinational enterprises have been implicated in shifting income or profits from Africa 
through transfer pricing, with estimated revenue losses exceeding $10 billion a year.87 
Mispricing is a form of trade-based money laundering.88 Trade-base ML is defined as “the 
86 Baker (2005: 134).
87 Tax Justice Network for Africa (2006: 3).
88 Goredema (2011: 3).
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process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade 
transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins. In practice, this can be achieved 
through the misrepresentation of the price, quantity or quality of imports or exports”.89
In resource-rich countries, high amounts of taxes are evaded through the negotiation of 
contracts between the state and extracting companies, which result in very low taxes being 
paid by the latter. Revenue collection linked to extraction and export is seriously affected 
by corruption, as a result of low or no competition in the sector, and of the discretionary 
political control over the resources. Additionally, contracts are negotiated with subsidiaries 
incorporated in offshore jurisdictions, which afterwards proceeded with high-interest loans, 
in order to avoid taxes in the home country.90 Underreporting production and underpricing 
minerals appear to be two major channels for tax evasion in the mining sector.91
3 Criminalisation of tax evasion under ML
Following the discussion of the harmful consequences of fiscal competition, and the most 
common methods of tax evasion, this section aims at analysing whether criminalising tax 
evasion under the umbrella of the ML would be an effective and appropriate way of dealing 
with the issue. AML consists of two elements, one of criminal law, that is the criminalisation 
of the conduct, and one regulatory, which aims at preventing the abuse of the financial 
system for ML purposes. 
3.1 The rationale of AML
“The primary reason for fighting ML is to enable law enforcement authorities to confiscate 
the proceeds of predicate criminal activities in those situations where confiscation might 
otherwise not be possible”.92 The crime of ML was, in fact, invented, to “follow the money” 
89 FATF (2006b).
90 Le Billon (2011: 6).
91 Le Billon (2011: 7).
92 Stessens (2000: 85). However, against this opinion it can be argued that, once there is enough evidence 
to prove the serious predicate offence, states could attach a duty to proceed with assets forfeiture to the 
main offence, without needing the ML conviction. See Alldridge (2003: 65).
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of criminal groups, since the imprisonment of even top ranking criminals did not result in a 
reduction of organised crime rates.93 The underlying idea was to attack the criminals' 
economic wealth, through assets recovery mechanisms. This, it was believed, would 
improve the effectiveness of the fight against ML and criminal activities, such as drug 
trafficking.94 Assets recovery has been recognised as a key element also in the fight 
against corruption, under UNCAC.95 Additionally, since most high level criminals usually 
stay aloof from the commission of crimes, while enjoying the financial profits, ML can serve 
the purpose of gathering evidence against top criminals by tracking the movement of 
money.96 
The crime of ML punishes conduct aimed at disguising and concealing the origin or the 
ownership of the proceeds of crime. In particular, when AML law allows the confiscation of 
the equivalent, this can result in an advantage for law enforcement, when proceeds of 
crimes have been intermingled with lawful assets, or are held by bona fide third parties. In 
the first case it should be still possible to confiscate the equivalent value of assets from the 
money launderer, and, in the second case, the object of confiscation will be any property 
deriving from the ML, even the profit made by the selling of the criminal assets to bona 
fide third parties. Financial gain is also what moves tax evaders. If the earnings resulting 
from tax evasion might be confiscated as proceeds of ML, this may become a deterrent for 
legal persons involved in fiscal crimes. The question, with regard to legitimacy under 
criminal laws, is this: Can tax evasion be the predicate offence which justifies the court in 
93 In opposition, it has been demonstrated that when criminal assets remain untouched from law 
enforcement measures, and all effort is put on the imprisonment of criminals, criminal groups will expand 
their scope and scale of violence and corruption to public officials to protect themselves from 
prosecutions. This “paradox of expected punishment” shows that a functioning financial intelligence, co-
operating with investigative authorities, which follows the “dirty money”, is essential to effectively combat 
organised crime. See Buscaglia (2008: 11).
94 ML was, in fact, first regulated in the Vienna Convention, which deals with the criminalisation of dealing 
with illicit drugs and psychotropic substances in Article 3(1)b i and ii.
95 Article 51 of UNCAC.
96  Stessens (2000: 86).
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issuing a confiscation order?
3.2 Elements of the crime
ML is a derivative crime. The elements of the crime determining the actus reus are: The 
commission of a predicate offence and the presence of the proceeds of crime. The mens 
rea required is the intent to conceal the proceeds and the knowledge of unlawfulness.97 
With regard to the scope of ML, it has been shown to be flexible, and has been, in fact, 
expanded since the Vienna Convention. Currently, the FATF Recommendations list twenty 
categories of designated offences. Among them there are serious tax crimes.
The standard of proof of the ML predicate offence can be lower than that for an ordinary 
crime. This means that the commission of the antecedent crime does not need to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.98 In the UN Conventions, the law requires that 
predicate offences must be established,99 but there is no requirement of a previous 
conviction. Therefore, the prosecution must prove that the property generated through tax 
evasion is illegal but does not warrant a conviction for tax evasion.
Proceeds of crime are usually considered properties deriving from the commission of a 
criminal offence; for example, money obtained from drug smuggling is ab initio criminal. 
Monies deriving from tax evasion, are, instead, lawfully earned, but may become tainted, 
for example, when not declared or when retained due to fraudulent tax deductions. 
This has raised criticism, on the basis that the proceeds of tax evasion are different in 
nature from profits of conventional criminality; yet, even though the underlying conduct 
which generates the proceeds may be legal, it is the retention of the money that should be 
97  Article 28 of UNCAC.
98 For example, in the UK, prosecution can prove that a property is a proceed of a crime, “by evidence of the 
circumstances in which the property is handled which is such as to give rise to the irresistible inference 
that it can only be derived from crime”, Court of Appeal in Anwoir (2008); see also McCluskey (2009: 
719).
99 Article 23 of UNCAC; Article 6 of the Palermo Convention.
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paid over as tax which constitutes the criminal conduct.100 It might be argued that proceeds 
of crime are monies “derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the 
commission of an offence”,101 and therefore monies retained are not included. However, it 
is the evasion of taxes that generates the illicit profits. It can be, thus, argued that those 
profits derive from an offence.
ML convictions should be followed by confiscation of criminal assets. With regard to tax 
evasion, problems arise because usually tainted money is intermingled with lawful money. 
It is, thus, difficult to identify the dirty amount. Furthermore, it might be difficult to find out 
the right amount of tax evaded. The quantity of the unpaid tax is the quantity of the benefit, 
and any part of the tax evader's property might be the object of assets recovery, once the 
mens rea is proved.102
Another controversial issue, in relation to fiscal offences, is whether they amount to a 
predicate offence if committed abroad. The traditional approach is, in fact, that countries 
are not supposed to enforce other countries' revenue laws. Some jurisdictions, therefore, 
do not consider tax offences predicate crimes if committed abroad.103 Besides the 
sovereignty principle, there are also practical problems, since the suspected offence 
committed abroad must be a criminal offence in that country too. This assigns domestic 
prosecution a burden of collecting information about foreign legislation on tax matters. The 
tax evasion might be discovered by tax authorities only after some years. This might 
undermine the system of reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions, if 
they cannot access information about the lawfulness of the transaction under tax law. It 
should be clearer, for this purpose, to what extent a fiscal offence committed abroad can 
100 Oliver (2009: 57).
101 Article 2 of UNCAC.
102 Alldridge (2001: 353).
103 Implementation Review Group of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2011: 7).
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be considered a predicate crime, and  there should be faster and easier ways of 
exchanging tax information between countries.
3.3 Tax evasion, ML and Human Rights
Including tax evasion as an antecedent offence for ML charges may raise inconsistencies 
with human rights, particularly with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which protects the right to private life. A person's financial affairs, the relation between 
client and accountant, and the confidentiality between the client and the professional 
advisor, are protected by this article. Therefore, compelling disclosure on fiscal 
management may, on the face of it, seem a breach of the individual's right to privacy,104 
and of the confidentiality principle.105 Yet, tax evasion is not only a private matter, but 
affects the whole public. Moreover, the confidentiality between the client and the 
professional advisor is not an absolute right, and is not protected to the extent that 
privilege between lawyer and client is. 
Article 6 of the European Convention deals with the right to a fair trial. The use of 
investigative powers of the revenue authorities to generate evidence for ML prosecutions 
might not be consistent with the provision. In addition, if even the proceeds of crime are 
considered subject to taxation, there is the danger that law enforcement will treat proceeds 
of drug trafficking, for example, as tax evasion, and choose to charge drug dealers with 
ML, just by proving the undeclared income.106 The underlying claim seems to be that tax 
evasion liability can serve as a useful fallback for authorities who are unable to acquire 
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction for the main crime, as in the famous case of Al 
Capone, who was finally convicted for tax evasion by American authorities, because of 
their incapability of bringing charges of organised criminal activities against him. However, 
104 Alldridge (2001: 354).
105 Flight (2001: 324).
106 Alldridge (2001: 354).
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law enforcement, while aiming at fighting against crime, should not violate fundamental 
democratic principles, such as the principle of legality.107
Despite difficulties and controversies which may arise by including tax evasion under the 
umbrella of ML, the fact that the FATF Recommendations now list serious tax crimes as 
predicate offences might help to pressurise countries to harmonise their tax laws, which 
would make mutual legal assistance easier as far as tax matters are concerned. 
Additionally, techniques used for tax dodging involve identical mechanisms and financial 
subterfuges as those used for ML. This means that the same means employed to obtain 
mutual legal assistance with regard to money laundering crimes, for example, by resorting 
to the use of Financial Intelligence Units, may be used for tax-related offences. 
3.4 AML regulations applied to tax evasion cases
The second element of the AML regime is the regulatory part. This has a preventive 
purpose, and imposes duties on the financial sector, on professionals, and on some 
designated non-financial businesses, to detect money launderers. Tax evasion is usually 
committed through the help of professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, corporate 
service providers and bankers. Accountants play a major role in providing schemes to 
save great amount of taxes.108 The question whether lawyers accepting dirty money when 
dealing with criminals and knowing that the money might stem from illicit sources is an 
argument of current debate. With regard to tax evasion, when the professional adviser 
suspects tax evasion and the funds are clearly identifiable, but still enters into 
arrangements or provides advice, he/she will face prosecution for failing to disclose the 
suspicion.109 Usually, tax authorities have difficulty in proving a conspiracy between a 
taxpayer and his professional adviser. The extension of ML legislation to tax evasion may 
107 Alldridge (2001: 354).
108 Tax Justice Network (2005: 30).
109 Brandon (2000: 41).
28
 
 
 
 
make it easier to bring charges in relation to such transactions because the investigation 
does not have to prove the tax offence in regard to the professional.110 
On the one hand, with respect to AML regulations dealing with financial institutions, it has 
to be noticed that it will be difficult to extend the Know Your Customer and the Customer 
Due Diligence requirements, since commercial crimes, such as tax evasion, might not 
raise suspicions of conventional dirty money. On the other hand, banks and other financial 
institutes may over-report suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit, to 
avoid being regarded as being party to the ML scheme of their customer.111
4 Conclusion
ML has been criminalised in the majority of the countries in the world. This fortifies the 
AML regulatory regime. However, AML regulations have not reduced the number of money 
laundering offences committed, especially the predicate offences which give rise to the 
money laundering. In particular, AML standards have been criticised because when one 
compares the costs of implementation with the benefits obtained, the standards do not 
seem to be effective. Rules of prevention of ML impose high costs of compliance on the 
public and the private sector. This results in a great burden being imposed on small 
business enterprises and on  countries with low government spending possibilities. There 
are therefore no apparent advantages. Countries continue to seek compliance with 
international AML standards because the cost of non-compliance is expensive, meaning 
that  it results in their being boycotted by foreign investors. These considerations need to 
be borne in mind when tax evasion is made a predicate offence for ML 
John Christensen has suggested that “grand” tax evasion be included under the label of 
110 Bridges (1996: 169).
111 Bridges (1996: 166).
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corruption, in order to apply the UNCAC legal framework to the offence.112 Other authors 
have also recognised UNCAC’s potential for tackling illicit financial flows.113  Corruption has 
been studied mainly from the demand point of view (e.g. the side of the corruptor). This 
means, for example, passive corruption of African political leaders and senior public 
officials. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index classifies many 
African states as very corrupt countries and the industrialised world, such as Switzerland, 
as least corrupt.114 Pointing fingers “at petty officials and ruling kleptomaniacs has resulted 
in insufficient attention being paid to the (largely) Western financial intermediaries who 
facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of corruption through offshore companies, trusts 
and similar subterfuges”.115 To make real efforts to stop illicit flows, it is necessary to tackle 
the abuse of banks and offshore jurisdictions. Eva Joly advocated for a shift of the 
corruption discourse to phase two, in which the role of bankers, lawyers and offshore 
financial centres in enabling corrupt practices comes under far greater scrutiny.116 The legal 
framework provided by UNCAC, which requires, specifically, the criminalisation of private 
sector corruption, by supporting the establishment of corporate responsibility, for example, 
could be useful also to prosecute corporations engaged in high-level tax evasion. The fact 
that UNCAC sidesteps the requirement of dual criminality, which has traditionally 
constituted a major obstacle to effective cooperation, might also result in an advantage in 
the international co-operation against tax crimes. The system of seizure and recovery of 
assets, set as a fundamental principle in the Convention, under article 51, can be an 
essential tool to address grand tax evasion, too. 
However,  all States Parties must ratify any modification of the UN Convention before it 
112 Christensen (2007: 11).
113 Chene (2011: 3).
114 Transparency International (2011).
115 Christensen (2011: 186).
116 Christensen (2011: 193).
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can take effect. Trans-governmental bodies are more flexible and thus more suitable to 
tackle the rapid changes that take place in the financial system. For this reason, the fact 
that the FATF has introduced tax crimes as predicate offences for ML in the 
Recommendations may represent a breakthrough in international financial regulation.
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 CHAPTER 3
 INTERNATIONAL AML FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO TAX CRIMES
Currently, the FATF Recommendations list tax crimes as a designated category of 
predicate offences for ML. The idea of including tax crimes under ML is the outcome of a 
long process, where international organisations and trans-governmental bodies have 
recognised the negative impact of fiscal offences, and have identified in the AML 
framework a suitable scheme to combat more effectively tax crimes. 
1 Historical overview of the expansion of the scope of international AML 
regulation with respect to tax crimes
ML is a derivative crime. Its definition as a crime depends on the origin of the proceeds of 
crime involved. With time, the international community has broadened the range of 
predicate offences, and thus the meaning of the crime. Major changes in the definition 
have been on an ad hoc basis as particular crimes have come to public awareness. 
The crime of ML was first regulated at an international level in the Vienna Convention of 
1988.117 However, the scope of this convention was limited to crimes related to drug 
trafficking. Tax crimes were not included as predicate offences. Since then, the scope of 
international AML law has been expanded, with  tax evasion being a key area of dispute.118
In 1989 the FATF was formed by the G7 member States, the European Commission and 
eight other industrialised countries. The aim was to ensure a more efficient prevention of 
the use of financial institutions for the laundering of drugs proceeds. Although some parts 
aimed at cracking down on tax havens and generally on economic crimes,119 a 
117 Although this instrument does not use the term “money laundering”, article 3 of the Vienna Convention 
lists as an offence the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin, and the concealment or disguise of 
the true nature of property, knowing that such property derived from an offence. 
118 Levi (2002: 182).
119 President Mitterand of France advocated such a direction in 1989 at the G7 Summit in Paris, where the 
FATF was founded; Pieth (2004: 8).
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compromise had to be reached and tax matters were excluded from the scope of the task 
force.120 In the same year, the Council of Europe expanded the definition of ML beyond the 
scope of drug trafficking to include the proceeds derived from any criminal activity, by 
adopting the Strasbourg Convention.121 Despite two previous European Protocols on 
extradition122 and mutual legal assistance,123 which had provided that cooperation could  
not been refused solely on the ground that the predicate offence was considered a tax 
offence in the country, in the Strasbourg Convention, co-operation could be refused in 
case of a fiscal offence.124 
In 1990, the FATF issued a report containing a set of Forty Recommendations. These were 
intended to provide a comprehensive plan of action needed to combat and prevent ML. In 
1991 the European Council issued a Directive125 with the goal of strengthening the 
implementation of the Vienna Convention and the FATF Recommendations of 1990. The 
category of ML offences extended beyond the scope of drug-related crimes; yet States 
Members were free to determine their own list. These steps, which were taken at a 
European level, stimulated the FATF process of expanding the scope of ML within the 
Recommendations. 
In fact, in 1996 the FATF redrafted Recommendation 4 by including all serious offences as 
predicate crimes for ML, but leaving national jurisdictions free to define this category. The 
change was nevertheless crucial: ML was no longer seen as only a drugs-related offence 
120 Switzerland, especially, agreed to join the task force only after having been assured that tax matters were 
not part of the negotiations; Pieth (2004: 9). 
121 Article 1(e) of the Warsaw Convention defines “predicate offence” as “any criminal offence as a result of 
which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in Article 9 of this 
Convention”; Art. 9 describes the money laundering offences. According to the Warsaw Convention, any 
offence that originates proceeds may be a predicate offence.
122 Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition.
123 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
124 Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention.
125 Directive 91/308/EEC.
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which required a drugs-related countermeasure, but an offence which fed ill-gotten gains 
into the lawful economy and which therefore required an appropriate response. In June 
1997, the European Council, in its Action Plan on Organised Crime, stated that “fiscal 
authorities should be subjected nationally to a similar reporting obligations for transactions 
connected with organised crime, at least for transactions relating to value added tax (VAT) 
and excise”,126 and that tax fraud linked to organised crime should be treated as a form of 
organised crime. The European Council recognised that the major driving force behind 
organised crime is the pursuit of financial gain. It therefore saw the necessity of tackling 
any economic crime, including VAT and other fiscal frauds. 
However, the European Banking Federation reported to the European Commission, in 
June 1998, that the creation of a fiscal offence under ML would be counterproductive. 
Firstly, because revenue offences were not seen as serious enough in comparison to 
organised criminal activities; secondly because tax fraud does not create an identifiable 
asset which can be detected for ML prevention; and  thirdly because the report of all tax- 
related, suspicious transactions would violate the right to privacy, and because the 
extension of the scope of ML to revenue offences would alienate many countries otherwise 
committed to the fight against organised crime. Another argument raised  had to do with 
the fact that some countries did not see anything wrong with money stemming from tax 
evasion.127
In 1998, the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention presented the results of its 
report called Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-laundering. The report 
concluded, among other things, that “one of the key remaining facilitators of crime has 
been the tax avoidance/evasion exemption in the laundering regulations of many 
126  Paragraph 26(e) of the European Council Action Plan on Organised Crime.
127  Oliver (2009: 60).
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countries”.128 The UNODC did not recommend the inclusion of tax-related crimes in AML 
regulation, but it warned about the fact that the secrecy veil on tax matters would hamper 
the combating of ML by leaving open the opportunity of evading conviction by representing 
transactions as tax-related.129 
The G7 Finance Ministers, in May 1998, encouraged the tackling of tax-related crimes 
through the international AML system and through exchanging information on taxes.130 
A significant move towards the international recognition of the necessity of dealing with tax 
crimes was made by the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs with the publication of the 
report titled Harmful Tax Competition: an emerging global issue. This document provided 
defensive measures for restraining harmful tax competition.131 The OECD work triggered a 
debate on revenue losses as a result of harmful tax competition. A dialogue between the 
FATF and the OECD came into being to examine ways of improving co-operation between 
tax and AML authorities,  and as a result, workshops for experts were organised to share 
expertise in both fields.132 
In 1999  the FATF adopted an Interpretative Note to Recommendation 15.133 It dealt with 
suspicious transaction reports and provided that all reports on  transactions concerning tax 
matters should be allowed to be reported. The idea behind this was that if a link with tax 
matters would stop suspicious reports, money launderers would always try to make tax 
128  Blum Levi Naylor Williams (1988: 51). 
129 The link with tax matters was often used as a ground to refuse co-operation and information disclosure for 
purposes of AML.
130 OECD (2012c).
131 See Chapter 2.
132 OECD (2012c).
133 Recommendation 15: “If financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity, they should 
be required to report their suspicions to the competent authorities.” Interpretative note: In implementing 
Recommendation 15, suspicious transactions should be reported by financial institutions regardless of 
whether they are also thought to involve tax matters. Countries should take into account that, in order to 
deter financial institutions from reporting a suspicious transaction, money launderers may seek to state 
inter alia that their transactions relate to tax matters. See The FATF Recommendations (1996).
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related transactions. In the same year the G8  expressed deep concern about the growth 
in illicit international financial transactions, including money laundering, as well as wide-
scale tax evasion, emphasizing how the two phenomena were related to each other.134
In the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which was adopted in 2000, 
the criminalisation of the laundering of the proceeds of crime had to be applied to the 
widest range of predicate offences.135 In particular, states were required to include as 
predicate offences all serious crimes punishable with up to four years’ imprisonment,136 or 
offences  associated with organised criminal groups. Tax crimes were not explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the Convention.  Article 2 refers to “serious offences” (maximum 
prison sentences of at least four years), and since tax evasion, for instance, may be a 
criminal offence in one jurisdiction and an administrative offence in another, ML linked to 
tax offences is not covered by the Convention.137 However, mutual legal assistance cannot 
be refused on the sole ground that the predicate offence involved a tax related matter.138 At 
the IMF meeting in Washington, in April 2000, the UK’s  Chancellor of the Exchequer 
called for a strong response to offshore tax havens and to financial crimes, and raised the 
need to link ML to tax matters.139
After the 9/11 bombings in America, the 40 Recommendations were complemented with 9 
special recommendations against the financing of terrorism. Yet, FATF member states 
were still far from agreeing on whether countries should be compelled to include tax 
offences as a predicate crime for ML.140 In 2001, the European Second Money Laundering 
Directive141 amended the first one by expanding the scope of the predicate offences to all 
134 G7 (1999).
135 Article 6 of the Palermo Convention.
136 Article 2 of the Palermo Convention.
137 UNODC (2011: 124).
138 Article 18(22) of the Palermo Convention.
139 Alldridge (2001: 350).
140 Levi (2002: 186).
141 Directive 2001/97/EC.
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serious offences  for which suspicious transaction reporting was now mandatory. The 
Directive also extended the reporting obligation to non-designated financial business and 
professions (hereafter DNFBPs).142  
In 2003, the Recommendations were revised, and a common minimum definition of 
“serious offences” was established. Recommendation 1 left it open to states to choose in 
the list between the “threshold” or the “all offences” approach. The Glossary listed 20 
areas that had to be included. Yet, tax related offences were not explicitly included. 
However, the interpretative note to Recommendation 13 (Reporting of suspicious 
transactions and compliance) states that “suspicious transactions should be reported by 
financial institutions regardless of whether they are also thought to involve tax matters”. 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which was signed in 2003, 
requires States Parties to criminalise the laundering of proceeds deriving from the widest 
range of predicate offences, as a minimum, from the criminal offences established in 
accordance with the Convention.143 Although tax evasion is not mentioned, requests for 
extradition144 and mutual legal assistance145 cannot be refused solely on the ground that 
the offence involves fiscal matters.
In 2005 the Council of Europe adopted the Third Money Laundering Directive146 with the 
aim of providing a common basis for implementing the revised international standards, and 
to tackle new risks and practices that came into being since Directive 2001/97/EC.  Article 
3(5) of this Third Directive sets out a range of “serious crimes”. Beyond the listed offences, 
142 “Designated non-financial businesses and professions mean: Casinos; Real estate agents; Dealers in 
precious metals; Dealers in precious stones; Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals 
and accountants” The FATF Recommendations (2012: 112).
143 Article 23 of UNCAC.
144 Article 44(16) of UNCAC.
145 Article 46(22) of UNCAC.
146 Directive 2005/60/EC.
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Article 3(5)(f) takes a general approach with respect to all other offences which carry a 
punishment of imprisonment based on a mixture of maximum and minimum thresholds.147 
The threshold approach already allowed national jurisdictions to include tax offences, but 
this was not mandatory.
Nowhere in the Directive is the issue of tax evasion specifically exempted from the list of 
predicate offences, especially with regard to the obligation of professionals to report 
suspicious transactions. Tax advisers are not excluded from the duty; on the contrary, the 
Directive focused attention specifically on the professions.148
In 2010, the FATF produced a document in which AML policies were dealt with in 
conjunction with tax matters149  in regard to voluntary tax compliance programmes (VTC). 
VTC programmes may consist of voluntary disclosure mechanisms, tax amnesty 
incentives or asset repatriation. They are introduced by states with the aim of raising tax 
revenue, increasing tax honesty and compliance, or facilitating assets repatriation for 
economic purposes. These programmes encourage taxpayers to declare previous 
undeclared assets which were held outside of the formal financial system or held in 
another jurisdiction. The effect would be to give such assets legitimacy. But the verification 
of repatriated assets is still difficult, given the fact that information on the assets and the 
taxpayer may be held in different jurisdiction. Furthermore, VTC programmes can exempt 
financial institutions from the duty to conduct full customer due diligence, and may grant 
the taxpayer immunity from investigation or prosecution for ML in relation to declared or 
repatriated assets. Having recognised the potential abuse of such programmes to move 
147 Article 3 (5)(f). “All offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a 
maximum of more than one year or, as regards those States which have a minimum threshold for 
offences in their legal system, all offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a 
minimum of more than six months”.
148 Bridges (2010: 164).
149 FATF (2010a).
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illicit funds, the FATF set out international best practices to assist jurisdictions in their 
implementation of VTC programmes. The idea was to ensure that such programmes do 
not impede the effective implementation of AML measures. Although this document does 
not encompass tax related offences within the AML framework, it identifies the strong 
relationship between the two phenomena, and the risk of considering them separately. 
Until the recent revision of the FATF standards, states were never obliged to include tax-
related crimes as a predicate offence for for ML. Getting international consensus had been 
easier on issues linked to drug trafficking and terrorism than to environmental crimes and 
tax evasion.150 However, a debate on the urgency of tackling large scale tax evasion had 
emerged. It was prompted by the OECD, the UN, the G20, and other regional 
organisations. This call to develop an awareness about this issue could not be ignored by 
the mainstream parties involved in the fight against ML. As a matter of fact, fundamental 
changes in the international AML framework are triggered by actions undertaken by the 
FATF.
The discussion now turns to focus on the implications of the FATF Recommendations of 
February 2012, which include serious tax crimes as a predicate offence for ML. 
2 The revision process of the 2012 FATF Recommendations
The FATF Recommendations are subject to periodic reviews. The reason for this is to 
monitor the relevance of the Recommendations, to keep them abreast of new 
developments, and to see what countries can learn from the outcomes of mutual 
evaluations. In preparation for the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations, the process of 
reviewing the Recommendations started already in 2009. In 2010 the first Round of Public 
Consultation with representatives of the financial sector, the DNFBPs, and non-
governmental organisations, was undertaken to assess the first phase of the review. With 
150 Levi (2002: 182).
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regard to tax crimes, the FATF expressed, in a consultation paper, that it was “considering 
including tax crimes as a predicate offence for money laundering in the context of 
Recommendation 1”.151
2.1 The first round of public consultations
Many stakeholders from the financial sector and from the DNFBPs raised their concerns 
about the inclusion of tax crimes as designated offences.152 One of the reasons for these 
concerns was that small AML institutions find it hard to monitor violations  due to lack of 
capacity, especially fiscal expertise. As to the cost-benefit relationship, the concern here 
was that the cost of monitoring tax offences is disproportionate to the expected outcome. 
Another reason for disquiet was that the new requirements would place an additional 
administrative burden on the financial industry, without taking into consideration time and 
budget constraints. Other opposing arguments raised were the following: the controversial 
distinction between tax avoidance and evasion, and legitimate tax planning; and the lack of 
an internationally accepted definition of tax crimes. In addition, stakeholders lamented the 
inconsistency of AML preventive measures with the legal framework on tax matters. STRs 
are effective if filed as soon as transactions are undertaken, but the time lapse between a 
tax payment and a verification of the correctness of it by national tax authorities, because 
of protracted court cases involving tax authorities and tax payers and the difficulty of 
gaining access to information during on-going court proceedings, could undermine the 
reporting of suspicions. Moreover, banks and other financial institutions would find it 
cumbersome and impracticable to obtain tax information on foreign customers and to 
acknowledge tax laws governing international clients. They would therefore have to file an 
STR each time a company is transacting with a low tax jurisdiction, which could result in 
over-reporting. The FATF therefore needs to assist financial institutions to identify STRs in 
151 FATF (2010b).
152 FATF (2011b; c; d).
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relation to tax crimes.
It was observed that, as a matter of principle, financial intermediaries should be absolved 
from the duty to ensure that national taxes are paid. There were also concerns that to give 
prosecutors the choice to prosecute alternatively under an AML statute would undermine 
due process safeguards in the prosecution of tax cases. Some stakeholders suggested 
that a detailed analysis should be made of the impact of the new provision on national 
jurisdictions, and that it is necessary to clarify the distinction between avoidance and 
evasion. Insurance associations considered whether whether insurers and their 
intermediaries should be required to report taxpayers who have evaded insignificant 
amount of income or have claimed unsubstantiated tax deductions.
NGOs took also part in the consultation.153 They observed that the inclusion of tax crimes 
in the list of designated offences would be a key change in relation to STRs, and that 
therefore the task force would need to specify the meaning of tax crimes in order to 
facilitate the work of financial institutions and DNFBPs. 
By recognising that every citizen is a victim of tax evasion, some NGOs applauded the 
prospective change in the Recommendations. Yet, they advocated for a common definition 
of tax crimes, since leaving the matter to countries would undermine mutual legal 
assistance and international co-operation. With regard to financial institutions and the 
probable and understandable concern about the need of knowledge of foreign tax 
jurisdictions, NGOs stated that these institutions should not act as judges by deciding on 
their own whether conduct amounts to a fiscal crime, but that their authority should be 
limited to not more than filing a report on suspicious transactions.
153 FATF (2011e).
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2.2 The second round of public consultations
Between 2010 and 2011 the FATF conducted a second round of public consultations with 
regard to reviewing the Recommendations. Responses from NGOS and individuals were 
partly positive, partly critical.154 The introduction of tax offences was opposed by some 
respondents on the basis that taxes are specific to jurisdictions. Others supported it on the 
ground that the information gathering  by fiscal authorities would benefit AML efforts and 
would further the goals of the OECD with respect to tax information exchange. NGOs 
called for strong collaboration and coordination between the FATF and the OECD to avoid 
the overlapping of regulations and efforts. 
2.3 The FATF’s official response
In 2012 the FATF published its official feedback to the more than 140 written comments 
that it had received during the public consultations. In particular, the document states that 
“[t]he responses received from the private sector on the inclusion of tax crimes as 
predicate offences were mixed, with a number of financial representative bodies 
supporting the proposal in general, while many representative bodies, including DNFBPs’ 
representative bodies, indicating concerns or rejecting the proposal. The concerns relate 
in particular to: (i) the scope of tax crimes, with a strong preference indicated that only 
serious tax crimes should be included; (ii) the lack in expertise and the inherent difficulty 
for the private sector in detecting tax crimes; and (iii) the need for a level playing field. The 
FATF had considered these concerns and the need to address the growing threat over the 
laundering of tax crimes proceeds. The change is thus calibrated to focus on the inclusion 
of serious tax crimes, and is similar to the approach that the FATF has taken consistently 
in defining the minimum range of predicate offences for money laundering as being 
serious offences. Countries would, therefore, have some flexibility with respect to the 
precise offences to be included in relation to its own circumstances”.155 
154 FATF (2011g; h; i).
155 FATF (2011f). 
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The FATF eventually expanded the scope of ML predicate offences to include serious tax 
crimes. In order to have a complete understanding of the content and significance of the 
new provision regarding tax crimes, Recommendation 3 needs to be read together with its 
Interpretative Note and the Glossary.
3 Tax crimes as a predicate offence for ML under FATF Recommendation 3 
The FATF revised standards were published on 16 February 2012. The revision of the 
Recommendations aimed at strengthening the protection of the integrity of the financial 
system by providing governments with stronger tools to take action against serious 
crime.156 Their scope has been expanded to deal with new threats and priorities, such as 
corruption, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation. One of the 
key changes to the FATF's standards was the inclusion of serious tax crimes in the list of 
the predicate offences for the crime of ML. 
Current Recommendation 3 (which is a summary of Recommendations 1 and 2 of 2006) 
requires that “countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the Vienna 
Convention and the Palermo Convention”. Countries should apply the crime of money 
laundering to all serious offences with a view to including the widest range of predicate 
offences. This Recommendation needs to be read in conjunction with the interpretative 
note. The note leaves governments free to decide whether to adopt a comprehensive 
approach, a designated list-approach or a threshold-approach.157 This freedom of choice is 
consistent with the fact that countries “have diverse legal, administrative and operational 
frameworks and different financial systems, and so cannot all take identical measures to 
156 FATF (2012c:2). 
157 Interpretative Note to Recommendation 3: “Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all 
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may 
be described by reference to all offences; or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences; 
or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach); or to a list of 
predicate offences; or a combination of these approaches”. The FATF Recommendations (2012: 34).
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counter these threats, (…) countries should implement measures adapted to their 
particular circumstances”.158 Yet, whichever approach is adopted, each country should, at a 
minimum, include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of offences. 
The Glossary lists among the category of offences, tax crimes (related to direct taxes and 
indirect taxes)159 and smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and 
taxes). When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under 
each of the categories listed, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic 
law, how it will define those offences and the nature of any particular elements of those 
offences that make them serious offences.160 
States that do not have tax crimes as predicate offences for money laundering are 
requested to implement this new provision by extending the scope of money laundering to 
cover serious tax crimes. Tax crimes constitute a broad category, so national jurisdictions 
are free to choose which specific conduct to include in this broad category. But only 
serious tax crimes must be taken into consideration for the purposes of AML, and the 
seriousness of the tax crime has to be defined in accordance with domestic law.
4 Impact of the Revised Recommendations of 2012 on regional groups
4.1 Implementation of the FATF regime in relation to tax crimes in Africa
The two main regional groups in Africa which are required to implement the  
Recommendations as associate members, are the ESAAMLG (Eastern and Southern 
African Anti-Money Laundering Group)161 and the GIABA (Inter-Governmental Action 
Group against Money Laundering in West Africa).162
158 Introduction to the FATF Recommendations.
159 Indirect taxes are, for example, VAT or excise duty. Direct taxes are income or corporation tax. 
160 FATF Recommendation 3.
161 The ESAAMLG comprises Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Republic of South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Union of Comoros, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
162 GIABA members are: Benin,Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
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GIABA countries already considered tax crimes as predicate offences for ML, before the 
FATF revised the Recommendations.163 The size of the informal economy, the nature of tax 
evasion, and the problem of corruption make West Africa, in fact, a unique environment for 
ML and terrorist financing.164 GIABA identifies the relation between tax evasion and ML as 
a crucial one for the West African region. In fact, tax evasion, together with smuggling, 
represents the major categories of predicate offences.165 High-level tax evasion in this 
region is mainly committed by high-income earners and corporations, and they do this by 
withholding tax documentation, understating their revenue or diverting cash into hidden 
accounts or assets.166 According to GIABA, the conducting of customer due diligence 
(CDD) is critically important for preventing the laundering of funds deriving from tax 
evasion.167 
Tackling tax evasion, and the other offences that exist within the informal economy, is 
fundamental to addressing the issue of ML in the region, and therefore all countries need 
to ensure that tax evasion is defined in national and regional laws and standards, 
respectively, as a predicate crime for AML purposes.168 
Until now, among the 12 countries comprising the SADC (Southern African Development 
Community) that committed themselves through the ESAAMLG, controversies persist on 
the range of predicate activities for ML. The ESAAMLG took notice of the change in the 
revised Recommendations, in relation to tax crimes and welcomed the step as an 
opportunity to facilitate co-operation between national authorities responsible for 
163 “Tax evasion is a predicate offence for money laundering, as well as a significant weakness – most 
prominently in terms of budgetary revenues – for many states in West Africa”; GIABA (2010: 19).
164 GIABA (2010: 5).
165 GIABA (2010: 7).
166 GIABA (2010: 20).
167 GIABA (2010: 22).
168 GIABA (2010: 31).
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investigating and prosecuting tax crimes. Furthermore, the ESAAMLG appreciated the fact 
that, thanks to this new input in the fight against tax offences, governments will be able  to 
have more public funds at their disposal to support policies and initiatives.169
4.2 Implementation of the FATF regime in relation to tax crimes in Europe
After the FATF Recommendations were revised in February 2012, the European Union 
committed itself to a rapid updating of the European Union’s legal framework to make 
provision for the incorporation of the necessary changes.170 Parallel to this process, the 
European Commission has also undertaken a review of the Third Money Laundering 
Directive with a view to addressing any identified shortcomings. This review comprises a 
study of the application of the Directive, and includes extensive contacts and consultations 
with private stakeholders and civil society organisations, as well as with representatives of 
EU Member States' regulatory and supervisory authorities. The Report on the application 
of the Third Directive published by the Commission in April 2012 states that the FATF has 
included tax crimes in the list of designated offences for ML. The Commission is 
considering whether the existing "all serious crimes" approach remains sufficient to cover 
tax crimes; whether tax crimes should be included as a specific category of "serious 
crimes" under Article 3(5); and  whether a further definition of tax crimes is required.171 
In July 2012, the European Commission published a Summary of Comments on the 
Report which were  made by public authorities, civil society bodies, business federations 
and companies in several fields (including financial services, the gambling sector, the legal 
169 FATF (2012b: 2).
170 “The Commission needs to act fast to incorporate the new standards into existing EU law. To this end, the 
Commission has already launched a process to review the functioning of the relevant legislation, i.e. the 
3rd AMLD, including the publication of an external application study and targeted consultations with 
private stakeholders and Member States. At the end of March, the Commission will adopt a report on the 
application of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive, following which work will begin on an impact 
assessment and the accompanying legislation, with the intention of adopting a legislative proposal, 
amending the 3rd AMLD, by end 2012”. European Commission (2012b: 4).
171 European Commission (2012c: 4).
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profession, the real estate sector, as well as trusts and company service providers).172 
The highest number of responses were on the issue of extending the scope of the Third 
Directive to include tax crimes as predicate offences for money laundering. 
The majority  favoured the introduction of tax crimes, because of the necessity of tackling 
tax evasion under the umbrella of AML, and also because of the fact that national 
jurisdictions already adopted the "all crimes approach". But, contrastingly, few considered 
the existing provision to be sufficient, suggesting in the alternative that "serious" tax crimes 
be limited, possibly by applying a threshold. This, it was said, would exclude errors when 
filling in income tax returns and when undertaking legitimate tax planning activities. 
Stakeholders asked, in addition, for  a clear definition of tax crimes and precise guidance 
in distinguishing tax avoidance from tax evasion.173 At the time of writing, the European 
Commission plans to table a proposal for a Fourth Money Laundering Directive in the 
autumn of 2012.174
172 European Commission (2012c). 
173 European Commission (2012c: 6).
174 European Commission (2012a).
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 CHAPTER 4
  A CASE STUDY: THE ITALIAN AML REGIME IN RELATION TO TAX CRIMES
The Council of Europe is drafting the Fourth Money Laundering Directive, which will align 
European law with the FATF revised standards, and will certainly expect EU member 
states to include serious tax crimes as a predicate offence for ML in their respective 
jurisdictions. Some countries already consider tax offences as crimes whose proceeds  
can be laundered. For example, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK violations of tax laws are 
considered a predicate offence for ML.175 Many countries, in fact, have adopted the “all 
crimes” approach. 
The 2002 UK Proceeds of Crime Act, for instance, does not refer any longer to certain 
predicate offences, but to “property obtained through unlawful conduct”,176 which is defined 
as property constituting the benefit from unlawful conduct, or which is represented by the 
person as such.177 Criminal conduct is any violation of UK criminal law, even if committed 
abroad. The UK, therefore, has almost abolished the concept of a predicate offence.178 In 
relation to foreign tax crimes, however, the prosecution still has to deal with the fact that in 
many jurisdictions tax crimes are not predicate offences yet. 
This chapter, takes a closer look at one national jurisdiction, Italy, with the aim of 
assessing the suitability of the AML regime to tax crimes, both from a domestic criminal 
point of view and from the local regulatory perspective.
175 Spreutels & Gissels (2000: 12). However, the criminalisation of tax evasion is not homogeneous, for  
some countries include only tax fraud, some require a link to a criminal group, and in some country there 
is still a debate going on; Tax Justice Network (2007: 17).
176 Chapter VII Money Laundering Offence, Proceeds of Crime Act.
177 Section 242, Proceeds of Crime Act.
178 Bell (2003: 138).
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1 Case study: Italy
It has been estimated that in Italy the annual value of money laundered amounts to 150 
billion Euro.179 Italy is a country with a very significant informal economy180 and a high 
incidence of organised criminal activities,181 yet it is an industrialised nation, with one of the 
higher GDPs. Italy has one of the highest rates of successful ML prosecutions in Europe, 
with almost 600 cases leading to convictions every year.182 However, only 5% of total 
detected ML transactions are prosecuted to a final judgement for ML.183  
1.1 ML in the Penal Code
ML in Italy is currently regulated under Article 648bis of the Penal Code.184 The provision 
criminalises the transformation or transfer of proceeds of crime, or the creation of 
obstacles to the identification of the origin of proceeds of crime, when the person did not 
commit or participate in the commission of the predicate offence (thus excluding self-
laundering cases). The punishment is imprisonment between four and twelve years, or a 
sanction between €1.032 and €15.493. The punishment can be increased if the action is 
committed in the exercise of a professional activity. The punishment is decreased if the 
proceeds derive from a crime for which the maximum punishment is less than five years’ 
imprisonment. Predicate offences can be any criminal offences if committed intentionally.
The provision is applicable even if the author of the predicate offence is not indictable, or 
179 Bank of Italy (2011).
180 The value of the informal economy, which includes legal businesses that are not registered with the 
revenue authorities, was estimated by the National Statistics Agency in 2008 to have been between € 255 
and 275 billion, which equated to between 16,3% and 17,5% of the GDP. ISTAT (2010: 1).
181 The mafia turnover was estimated as € 100.000 million. Parlamento Italiano (2012: 2).
182 FATF (2006a: 8).
183 Argentiero, Bagella & Busato (2008: 342).
184 Article 648Bis c.p. “Riciclaggio: Fuori dei casi di concorso nel reato, chiunque sostituisce o trasferisce 
denaro, beni o altre utilità provenienti da delitto non colposo, ovvero compie in relazione ad essi altre 
operazioni, in modo da ostacolare l'identificazione della loro provenienza delittuosa, è punito con la 
reclusione da quattro a dodici anni e con la multa da euro 1.032 a euro 15.493. La pena è aumentata 
quando il fatto è commesso nell'esercizio di un'attività professionale. La pena è diminuita se il denaro, i 
beni o le altre utilità provengono da delitto per il quale è stabilita le pena della reclusione inferiore nel 
massimo a cinque anni. Si applica l'ultimo comma dell'articolo 648. (Le disposizioni di questo articolo si 
applicano anche quando l'autore del delitto da cui il denaro o le cose provengono non è imputabile o non 
è punibile ovvero quando manchi una condizione di procedibilità riferita a tale delitto)”.
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not punishable, or when the proceeding for that offence is not admissible.185 A peculiarity of 
the Italian legal framework is that self-money laundering is not included, because Article 
648bis covers only the hypothetical situation of the money launderer who did not commit 
or participate in the predicate offence. The Legislature’s intention was to respect the 
double jeopardy principle. However, this makes Italy a “legal paradise for self-money 
launderers”,186 and has been, in fact, questioned by the FATF in the Mutual Evaluation 
Report (MER) of 2006.187 
ML is complemented by two other offences in respect of which the possession or 
acquisition of the proceeds crime or their use for economic or financial purposes is 
punishable.188 The mens rea required is generic intent (which encompasses dolus 
eventualis). This also covers knowledge of unlawfulness which, in this case, means 
knowledge of the criminal origin of the assets, as well as the wilful impeding of the 
identification of the criminal provenance of the assets.189 The Italian legal system does not 
provide for the criminal liability of companies, only for administrative sanctions.190 Article 
648quater requires the confiscation of the proceeds or the equivalent, without violation of 
the rights of bona fide third parties. The law allows for the prosecution of persons who 
assisted in the commission of the tax offence, without participating in the commission, for 
example, where the proceeds of the crime are transferred to the bank account of a family 
member or to that of a financial advisor. However, ML is punished more severely than tax 
offences.
185 Corte di Cassazione 11/05/2005 n° 23396. In this case the Supreme Court stated that even though the 
fiscal offences were remitted by a voluntary tax compliance law, the proceeding for ML was not affected.
186 Razzante (2012: 8).
187 FATF (2006a: 26).
188 Articles 648 and 648ter c.p.
189 Corte di Cassazione 30/01/2007 n° 6350; Corte di Cassazione 18/12/2007 n° 16980.  
190 Legislative Decree 231/2001.
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1.2 AML regulations
With regard to the prevention of ML, the Italian AML regulations are found in the 
Legislative Decree number 231 of 2007, which domesticates the Third European Money 
Laundering Directive, and which is, in fact, more in line with the international AML 
standards. The definition of ML, particularly insofar as it refers to prevention, includes also 
a hypothesis of self-laundering, and concealing and disguising the proceeds of crime is 
punishable even where the aim is to conceal not only the origin of the property, but also its 
ownership.191 Article 36 of the Decree allows the use of information collected in the 
fulfilment of AML preventive measures, for fiscal purposes. The preventive measures are 
based on those set out in the FATF’s Recommendations. The FATF has found Italy 
compliant in respect of almost all the preventive measures, except for the regulation of 
DNFBPs, Politically Exposed Persons, and the absence of specific requirements for cross-
border correspondent banking operations, with respect to gathering of information.192  
1.3 Revenue offences
Tax evasion has a great impact on Italian economy.193 Tackling tax evasion is a priority in 
relation to the current financial crisis, as the governor of the Bank of Italy affirmed in 
2011.194 The National Agency for statistics (ISTAT) calculated that the undeclared VAT in 
Italy in 2008 amounted to 9,8% of the GDP.195 
Tax related offences are regulated under the Legislative Decree number 74 of 2000, as 
amended by the Law 148 of 2011. The following categories of conduct are criminalised: 
fraudulent or non-declaration of income or value added tax in excess of a prescribed 
amount; the issuing of false invoices; the concealing or destruction of financial accounting 
191 Article 2(1)a; b of the Legislative Decree 231/2007.
192 FATF (2006a: 101).
193 FATF (2006a: 12).
194 Bank for International Settlements (2011: 1).
195 ISTAT (2010: 3).
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books, or the failure to pay tax.
Tax avoidance is not criminalised under this law. However, the Supreme Court (Corte di 
Cassazione), in various decisions, has recognised the existence of a general principle of 
anti-avoidance, which can be inferred from Article 53 of the Constitution.196 In particular, tax 
payers are not allowed to benefit fiscally from the abuse of loopholes existing in the law. 
Even though the conduct might not violate the law, if the person acts in fault of an 
economic reason that justifies the operation, different from mere tax saving, the conduct 
amounts to tax avoidance and is thus unlawful.197  
1.4 Is tax evasion a predicate crime for ML? 
The question whether tax offences can trigger a charge of ML has been long debated.
Arguments raised by those who disagree with the inclusion of tax offences under ML are 
linked to the nature of the criminal property, and to the fact that proceeds from tax evasion 
are usually intermingled with lawfully earned money. In particular, what derives from tax 
evasion is not a concrete profit, but a tax saving. By contrast, a predicate offence should 
generate new wealth, and not an undue advantage such as, say, the avoided 
impoverishment of the particular property.198 The impossibility of identifying the actual 
proceeds of the criminal conduct in the pool of money deposited into and held in a bank 
account, brought the Italian Supreme Court to block the freezing of a bank account.199 
There is still a raging debate on whether the proceeds of tax evasion should be regarded 
as criminal property susceptible to ML. However, a judgement handed down by the Italian 
Supreme Court in 2009, confirmed that the concept “proceeds of crime” can refer to an 
economic gain, which is added to the assets of the accused.200 
196 Article 53 states that everyone must contribute to public expenditure, according to their capacità 
contributiva.
197 Corte di Cassazione 23/12/2008 n° 30055.
198 Coseddu (2011: 6).
199 Corte di Cassazione 07/12/1992 n° 2206; Corte di Cassazione 20/09/2007 n° 38600.  
200 Corte di Cassazione 25/06/2009 n° 38691.
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In a landmark decision in 2008 the Supreme Court held that the crime of ML, as regulated 
under Article 648bis of the Penal Code (as amended), which aligned national law to 
international standards, discharges the accused from being found guilty, too, of committing 
the predicate offence. The court went on to affirm that, currently, all criminal offences 
committed intentionally can trigger a ML conviction, and among them are not only the 
typical ones such as corruption, bankruptcy crimes, and corporate crimes, but also fiscal 
offences.201
Therefore, the unlawfulness of the origin of the money has to be interpreted not in a 
physical-materialistic way (as the entry of illegal monies into the property of the accused), 
but in an economic sense. The profit, in fact, would not accrue to the assets of the 
accused without the criminal conduct occurring. The rationale here is that the money 
passes from a legal to an illegal status. 
Moreover, Article 1(143) of Law 244 of 2007 introduced a provision which allows for 
property to be confiscated to the value of its equivalent in the proceeds of the fiscal crime 
committed. By analogy, this provision could apply to ML cases as well. 
The predicate offence, consisting in a tax crime, is relevant even if committed abroad, if 
the conduct is considered a crime under the domestic law of that country, too. This is what 
a sentence of the Supreme Court established in relation to a case of ML where the 
proceeds derived from a fiscal offence committed in Spain. After having requested mutual 
legal assistance from Spain, and after having issued assurances that the relevant conduct 
201 “Il delitto di riciclaggio (…) è oggi svincolato dalla pregressa tassativa indicazione dei reati che potevano 
costituirne il presupposto, esteso attualmente a tutti i delitti non colposi previsti dal codice penale (per cui 
il delitto di riciclaggio può presupporre come reato principale non solo delitti funzionalmente orientati alla 
creazione di capitali illeciti quali la corruzione, la concussione, i reati societari, i reati fallimentari, ma 
anche delitti che, secondo la visione più rigorosa e tradizionalmente ricevuta del fenomeno, vi erano 
estranei, come ad esempio i delitti fiscali e qualsiasi altro)” Corte di Cassazione, 27/11/2008 n° 1024.
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constitutes a crime punishable with imprisonment under national law, the court proceeded 
with the ML charge.202 In a judgement released on 24 February 2011, the Supreme Court 
confirmed the confiscation of assets, obtained through tax fraud, and considered these as 
laundered proceeds.203 The persons accused were part of a criminal association. They did 
not participate in the commission of the tax offence and were therefore held liable for ML. 
The confiscation order aimed at the seizure of the equivalent value of the amount of 
proceeds deriving from the fiscal fraud and subsequently laundered. In a very recent case, 
the Court held in its reasoning concerning the lawfulness of a freezing order, that ML 
predicate offences, for which asset recovery can be undertaken, can be also tax-related 
crimes.204 
In another recent judgement, the Court dismissed the charges for ML in respect of the  
proceeds of corporate tax evasion, despite recognising that the conduct did constitute a 
predicate offence, because the accused person participated in the commission of tax 
evasion, as a shareholder of the company.205 In July 2012 the Court found an individual 
guilty under Article 648bis of the Penal Code, because he/she was involved in the 
concealing of assets derived also from tax fraud that was perpetrated by means of real 
estate transactions in Milan and through bank accounts held in the Principality of Monaco 
and in Switzerland. Notwithstanding the fact that the money was still traceable, because 
the person declared the dividends of those activities, the court asserted that the mere fact 
of having transformed them, in order to conceal the illicit origin, amounted to ML.206 In this 
case, too, one of the predicate offences was a tax crime.
202 Corte di Cassazione, 17/11/2009 n° 49427.
203 Corte di Cassazione, 24/02/2011 n° 11511.
204 Corte di Cassazione, 14/02/2012 n° 10359.
205 Corte di Cassazione, 15/06/2012 n° 36757.
206 Corte di Cassazione, 13/07/2012 n° 32936.
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2 Conclusion
From the discussion above we may conclude that in Italy tax evasion can be a predicate 
offence for ML. Yet the recognition of fiscal crimes as a source of criminal property is still 
controversial. The doctrine is still controversial. The process of implementing the revised 
Recommendations through the Fourth Money Laundering Directive should shed more light 
on some of the issues in dispute and would help to guarantee a uniform and coherent 
application of the standards. In Italy, controversies seem to arise mostly in relation to 
making fiscal crimes money laundering predicate offences. In other European countries, 
the reservations also concern the regulatory side. The Italian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) took notice of the fact that the revised version of the FATF Recommendations 
includes tax crimes among the designated offences.207 The FIU observes that tax evasion 
and ML are two phenomena that are linked to each other, because often the first is used to 
create funds utilised for criminal purposes, and that money launderers and tax evaders 
use the same financial tools and subterfuges to get around the law; the effects of both 
forms of conduct are the distortion of economic competition and of the allocation of 
resources.
207 Banca d'Italia (2012: 1).
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 CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has discussed the suitability of the anti-money laundering regime to tackle 
fiscal crimes. It concludes that that tax crimes can and should be addressed as predicate 
offences for ML. The second chapter has debated the topic from a theoretical point of view, 
by analysing how the two phenomena of tax evasion and ML relate to each other. The third 
chapter has addressed the matter in relation to the negotiations that have been 
undertaken at a international level, between trans-governmental organisations and private 
stakeholders, and within regional groups. The fourth chapter has presented one national 
perspective, by looking at the local legal debate that comes to light between the doctrine 
and the jurisprudence. In summary, it can be said that the AML regime is appropriate for 
dealing with tax crimes, because it provides a very sophisticated prevention system that 
has not only the potential of discouraging would-be tax evaders, but can also be a 
deterrent for professionals involved in high-level tax-dodging practices. Furthermore, 
leaving fiscal crimes out of the AML regime would enable money launderers to exploit a 
“tax loophole” by suggesting that their transactions are driven by tax reasons and not by  
the intention to conceal criminal property.
The discussion has showed that the FATF Recommendations, in particular, are the right 
instrument to address fiscal crimes. Notwithstanding concerns relating to the fact that the 
FATF standards are not a conventional source of international public law, as a matter of 
fact, this instrument has proved to be very effective in influencing regional legal 
frameworks, and thus national AML policies. Despite the fact that many jurisdictions in the 
world already classify tax offences as predicate crimes for ML, the matter is still a topic of 
debate, and the dissimilarities between national regulations can undermine international 
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co-operation with regard to  this matter. Therefore, the change in the Recommendations, 
which should result in a higher level of harmonisation, could tighten up the global 
combating of tax evasion.
At the time  of writing, for example, 10 EU States are ready to adopt a unified financial 
transaction tax208 for purposes of tackling the fragmented system of financial transactions 
tax. This is necessary in order to prevent distortions in competition and to avoid the risks of 
double-taxation and double non-taxation. It also diminishes the costs incurred by 
businesses to ensure that they remain compliant with the law. 
States need to aim at reducing opportunities for people and companies to avoid paying 
tax. There is also a need to increase transparency in business dealings and to encourage 
the exchange of information between the state and the main role players in the economy, 
for this can contribute to  the financial sector paying its proper share of the tax and not 
leaving the ordinary citizens burdened with onerous taxes.209 Once the tax is approved, it 
will be important to guarantee co-operation between states. In particular, if the Fourth 
Money Laundering Directive will recognise tax crimes as predicate offences for ML, as set 
out in the revised FATF Recommendations, the application of these two provisions may 
result in a very effective action against the abuse of the financial system to the detriment of 
public revenues. Tax advisors, lawyers and accountants will have the duty to report 
transactions which might have a tax-dodging purpose. This, added to the new tax on 
financial transactions and the facility of exchanging information between states, will result 
in a strong disincentive for  engaging in cross-border machinations aimed at  tax 
208 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, on the basis of 
European Commission proposal for a Directive on a financial transaction tax of September 2011, have 
asked the Commission to proceed through enhanced co-operation, to promote co-operation on a financial 
transaction tax among them; European Commission (2012b).
209 European Commission (2012b).
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avoidance or evasion.
The new FATF standards are a big step, indeed, in the direction of a ensuring a more 
sustainable pool of  public finance. However, there is still much  to be done. Concerns 
have already been raised by some non-governmental organisations210 about the missed 
chance of demanding more transparency in the financial system. What has been subject to 
most criticism is the fact that, without an obligation being imposed on states to publish a 
register of the ultimate beneficiaries of companies, shell companies will be still able to hide 
tax evaders. They will thus remain unpunished, notwithstanding the new severe regulation. 
As a result, the fight against tax crimes on a global scale could be undermined by the 
difficulty of gaining access to information about who are in fact the ultimate or beneficial 
owners of these anonymous companies. Without this knowledge, charging only the 
frontline actors with tax evasion will be a futile exercise. 
(Word count: 18.301)
210 Global Financial integrity (2012); Financial Task Force (2012); Tax Justice Network (2012); Tax Research 
UK (2012).
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